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Italy’s constitutional referendum resulted in a strong No vote in most parts of the country. But as
Stephen J. Larin and Marc Röggla highlight, this was not the case everywhere, with over 60 per
cent of voters in Italy’s predominantly German-speaking province, South Tyrol, backing the
proposed reform. They write that this was a victory for the province’s governing coalition, but that
the failure of the referendum may benefit separatist opposition parties in the long term if it leads to
an anti-EU government in Rome.
Check out EUROPP’s full coverage of Italy’s constitutional referendum.
One surprise about Italy’s referendum is that the strongest supporters of the proposed constitutional
reform speak German. South Tyrol, Italy’s northern-most and predominantly German-speaking
province, voted 63.7 per cent in favour of the constitutional reform – 6 per cent higher than any
other province – with at least 70 per cent support in more than half of the province’s 116
municipalities. The ‘No’ campaign won in only five municipalities, all of which are predominantly
Italian or Ladin-speaking.
Figure 1. Italy’s 2016 constitutional referendum results by province
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Source: Wikimedia Commons.
The article reporting these numbers is titled “Südtirol ist nicht Italien” (South Tyrol is not Italy), a reference to a
notorious slogan of the separatist South Tyrolean Freedom Party (Süd-Tiroler Freiheit). But the Freiheit, along with
the rest of the province’s opposition parties, campaigned against the reform. The reasons vary, but one of the most
prominent arguments was that the centralising reform could jeopardise South Tyrol’s autonomy.
Last month, however, the South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei – SVP), which governs in coalition
with the provincial branch of the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico Alto Adige – PD), decided to recommend
voting for the reform. The main reason for this is the inclusion within the reform bill of a so-called ‘safeguard clause’.
The relationships between Rome and Italy’s autonomous regions and provinces are explicitly set aside in the reform
bill (Article 39), and these relationships were to be renegotiated bilaterally after a successful referendum. This
‘safeguard clause’, the SVP and PD argued, would put South Tyrol’s autonomy arrangement on a better footing than
it has been until now, provide the opportunity to negotiate for greater competences, and meant that nothing would
2/3
change for the Province without its consent. Furthermore, a vote in favour of the reform would signal South Tyrol’s
willingness to ‘play ball’ and underline its good relationship with Renzi’s government.
It seems that a significant majority of German-speakers in South Tyrol found the SVP’s argument persuasive. This is
an impressive accomplishment, given the party’s recent internal fragmentation and the loss of some support to other
German-speaking parties. But it probably reflects public confidence that the SVP would not jeopardise the autonomy
arrangement more than increased support for the party itself (which won 45.7 per cent of the vote in 2013).
Now that the referendum has failed and Renzi has announced his resignation, however, South Tyrol’s opposition
parties may benefit in the long term. If the populist and Eurosceptic Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) were
to gain power and try to take Italy out of the European Union, for example, that would likely strengthen support for
separatism, as some polls indicate Brexit did in Scotland. In the short term, the result will likely lead to renewed
criticism of South Tyrol’s ongoing Autonomy Convention, billed by the Provincial Council as a participatory
democratic process to debate and draft a proposal for revising the 1972 Autonomy Statute, which has been partly
justified as a necessary response to impending constitutional reform.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics or EURAC. Featured image: Bolzano, South Tyrol – CC0 Public Domain.
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